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ABSTRACT 
The 2007-09 credit crunch has not only created problems for the UK’s 
public finances in meeting the costs of bailing out commercial banks and 
dealing with recession but also for providing better public services. This 
paper analyses the causes of the credit crunch, government policies to 
address it and its impact on the financing of new public sector infrastructure 
in the UK. It finds that provision of new public sector infrastructure and rela-
ted services has been adversely affected by the impact of the credit crunch on 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs). Commercial banks are now generally only 
willing to lend to replace collapsed PFI bond financing if new PFI contracts 
reduce financial risks. By such means, PFIs can be expected to survive but 
within an increasingly diverse mixture of procurement methods. 
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1. The Credit Crunch  

The “credit crunch” refers to the collapse in bank lending as the cost of 
(both retail and wholesale inter-bank) credit became prohibitively expensive or 
simply unavailable during 2007-09. It owes its origins to lax regulatory regimes 
for banks, weak central bank safety nets for banks facing liquidity problems, 
growth of the much less heavily regulated shadow banking system, rapid inno-
vation in financial products as banks competed aggressively for business, and 
the increasingly substantial international movements of capital.  
Financial innovation was encouraged by banks and other financial institu-
tions paying substantial annual bonuses to their directors and other employees 
to reward increased short-term sales of new financial products. Enjoying in-
creased annual dividend payments financed by the resulting rapid expansion of 
bank turnovers and profits, shareholders did not question the long-term sus-
tainability of such innovation. In combination, these developments resulted in 
the systemic failure of the financial services industry to abide by fiscal recti-
tude and prudential lending and borrowing. 
Bank failures, recessions and credit crunches are not new (Klein and 
Shabbir 2006). What was new for the 2007-09 credit crunch was the increas-
ing use of “securitization”, whereby banks and other financial institutions pack-
aged together mortgage debts and sold them on to other financial institutions 
both in their home countries and abroad. This included the “sub-prime mort-
gages” later subject to high default rates in the USA, UK and elsewhere.  
Mortgages became increasingly large multiples of house-buyers’ incomes 
and, with ever-lower cash deposits being required from borrowers, ultimately 
led to 100+% mortgages. This ongoing expansion of mortgage debt was fur-
ther accelerated by self-certification by borrowers themselves of their ability to 
repay debt, few banks carrying out checks. Additionally, more mortgages were 
being used for speculative buy-to let properties and homes were increasingly 
being re-mortgaged for non-residential purchases such as cars and foreign 
holidays. 
Original lenders took the view that it didn’t really matter if borrowers 
couldn’t make mortgage payments because rising house prices meant that 
such borrowers could always either refinance their mortgages or pay them off 
by selling their houses at inflated prices. Moreover, loan originators quickly 
sold sub-prime loans to other financial institutions which, in turn, repackaged 
and sold them to investors as innovative financial products (e.g. collateralised 
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debt obligations) paying higher rates of interest than offered by banks. Such 
financial innovation went hand-in-hand with the growth of non-bank financial 
institutions, these being less regulated than banks. 
Put simply, in pursuit of high profits, banking regulators, directors of banks 
and shareholders had allowed banks to expand too rapidly and to buy and sell 
exotic investments (including mortgage-backed bonds) that they themselves 
poorly understood. There was insufficient financial transparency and poor ap-
preciation of the increasingly risky nature of banking operations, banks rapidly 
moving from traditional (relatively safe) retail banking into (higher risk) invest-
ment banking.  
Banks had become reckless in their operations, due diligence being 
largely abandoned in the highly competitive scramble for higher turnovers and 
increased market shares. The risks associated with the extent of securitisation 
were unclear and the banks had no clear overview of their total risk exposure 
because of the failings of the ratings agencies (Jones, 2008). Investors who 
thought they were holding high-grade debt (rated AAA by the credit-ratings 
agencies) became exposed to rising rates of default in the USA sub-prime 
mortgage market.  
Globalisation of financial markets had enabled investors in other countries 
to buy this “toxic debt” and banks, pension funds, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions across the globe became increasingly exposed to 
risk of payment default on the part of debtors. They had bought that debt to 
diversify their financial portfolios and so supposedly reduce risk, being less 
exposed to a recession in their own countries. In practice, their exposure to 
financial risk was increased by the globalisation of financial markets, these 
cross-border investments acting as a “transmission mechanism” for recession 
to spread like a virus from one country to another – the collapse of Icelandic 
banks in late 2008 being a case in point.  
Banks in most EU member states had also pursued securitisation. They 
had become too highly levered, predominantly financing their mortgage busi-
ness not from their own deposits but, instead, by borrowing short-term on 
secondary markets to lend long-term to their mortgagees. As loans from other 
banks and financial institutions dried up, banks that had depended upon the 
secondary markets to refinance their loans experienced very severe cash flow 
problems, for example Northern Rock (Boakes, 2008).   
Put simply, the credit crunch was the result of governments’ deregulation 
of lending without introduction of sufficiently rigorous self-regulation, without 
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appropriate governance arrangements and without sufficient scrutiny of the 
risk models employed.  

2. The Response of Governments to the Credit 
Crunch 

The highly-speculative short-term financial model adopted by the senior 
executives of many banks to win them large annual bonuses has been criti-
cised for gambling long-term with other people’s money (i.e. their depositors 
and shareholders). Now national governments could similarly be criticised for 
being reckless with future tax-payers’ money as they borrow increasingly large 
proportions of GDP in order to “bail out” those heavily indebted banks and 
other private sector organisations.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculated the ratios of fiscal 
stimulus relative to GDP based on the initial measures announced by national 
governments in 2008 as: UK 1.5%, USA 4.9%, Japan 9.1%, Germany 3% and 
France 1.15%. Subsequently, in early 2009, the UK government began to ex-
change mortgage bonds (i.e. the toxic debt) for government bonds, take major-
ity shareholdings in banks and insure bank loans against default.  
The IMF calculated these additional measures increased the UK’s ratio to 
19.8%, as of February 2009, by far the highest ratio in the G20 countries (the 
USA’s rose to “only” 6.8%). These ratios increase as further debt-financed 
measures are announced and as GDP falls. The European Commission (EC) 
has forecast falls in GDP in most EU member states in 2009, including the UK 
by 3.8%. The IMF forecasts similar falls in the USA and elsewhere. The accelerat-
ing costs to the public purse of these measures raise questions about fiscal 
prudence, especially in the UK.  
Between 1997 and 2007 UK central government budgets had been based 
on its much-vaunted fiscal rectitude principle of “prudence for a purpose”. 
Response to the credit crunch now seems to be “imprudence for a purpose”. 
If the hoped-for higher levels of economic growth are not forthcoming, a 
deepening and prolonged recession/depression will make what had already 
been a long-term “structural gap” between (higher) government expenditures 
and (lower) revenues much greater (Bailey, 2004). This will exacerbate any 
losses the government (and, ultimately, taxpayer) incurs on its ongoing pur-
chases of increasingly large proportions of bank shares, swaps of government 
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bonds for toxic mortgage-backed bonds, guarantees of bank loans on both 
wholesale and retail money markets, etc., (Goodhart, 2009). The values of mort-
gage-backed bonds subsequently fell significantly below what the government 
paid for them. 
In buying up very large proportions of shares in several UK banks and in-
troducing special liquidity schemes, the government has effectively allowed 
banks to nationalise their rapidly increasing losses whilst privatising their prof-
its. Largely incalculable financial risks have been transferred from the private to 
the public sector, much the same occurring in other countries including the 
USA. This hardly seems prudential on the part of national governments and it 
creates moral hazard by setting a precedent for future taxpayer bailouts of 
highly irresponsible bank lending. Justifying the current high-risk fiscal largesse 
by arguing that doing nothing would be more costly for the future health of the 
economy is an act of faith in the success of the ever-increasing bank bailouts 
and fails to address how the huge increases in government debt will be repaid.  
Repayment will be even more difficult if interest rates rise from their very 
low-to-zero levels of early 2009 and by the downgrading of sovereign debt 
(used to refinance loans) by ratings agencies. The creditworthiness of at least 
ten countries had already been brought into question during late 2008, espe-
cially those holding Icelandic sovereign debt, Iceland itself being in receipt of 
emergency IMF loans. The increased cost of insuring against default (via credit 
default swaps and collateralised debt obligations) made sovereign debt issued 
by Argentina, Greece, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Serbia, South Korea and the Ukraine 
relatively unattractive by the end of 2008, notwithstanding the higher interest 
rates on offer. The sovereign debt of Greece and Spain was downgraded in 
early 2009, with Ireland, Portugal and other countries possibly soon following.   
The UK central government has abandoned its own fiscal rules, namely 
the “golden rule” (borrow only for capital, not current, expenditure) and the 
“sustainable investment rule” (net public debt no greater than 40% of GDP). 
Its own figures show that net public debt exceeded 50% of GDP in January 
2009 and forecast it to peak at almost 60% by 2012/13. Nevertheless, this still 
seems low compared with those EU eurozone countries rapidly approaching 
breaches of the Stability and Growth Pact. In January 2009 the EC forecast 15 
of them to be in breach of the Pact in 2009. It also forecast budget deficits to 
average 4.4% in 2010 and government debt to average 76% of GDP, both well 
above the Pact’s ceilings of 3% and 60% respectively (Fingland and Bailey 
2008).  
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It is notable that, whilst the UK central government is now guaranteeing 
bank bonds, it does not guarantee bonds issued by local governments (Bailey 
et al., 2009). It also does not guarantee the safety of councils’ bank deposits 
outside the UK, many having deposited large sums of money in Icelandic and 
other off-shore banks because of the higher rates of interest they offered on 
deposits compared with UK banks. In doing so, however, they forsook the 
protection afforded for deposits in UK banks. With the benefits of hindsight, 
this was highly imprudent lending (i.e. in the form of bank deposits) and con-
trasts sharply with the requirement for prudence in respect of their borrowing. 

3. Implications for the Provision of Public Sector 
Infrastructure in the UK  

The provision of public sector infrastructure and related services in the UK 
has relied increasingly on use of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) since the 
early 1990s. Explained in detail in an earlier issue of this journal (McQuaid and 
Scherrer, 2008), it is a form of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) intended to 
achieve value for money and reduce the need for the accumulation of public 
sector debt.  
Its growing use can also be explained by the increasing availability of easy 
money from banks and capital markets during the sustained economic growth 
of the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s. By 2009, there were 860 signed PFI 
projects with capital value exceeding £68 billion, most of them being launched 
since 1997.  Most of these projects (650) are in the operational phase (Tim-
mins, 2009a). 
In a typical PFI contract banks were initially providing 80 per cent and later 
on, with increased market confidence, up to 90 - 95 per cent of total capital 
requirement.  During the 2007-09 credit crunch, global economic downturn and 
unprecedented multi-billion pound state bailouts of banks etc., the finance 
system moved from highly speculative lending to a drastic reduction of the 
availability of finance.  The continued use of the PFI model to finance public 
service infrastructure became increasingly open to question.   
In 2008, following the collapse of the capital markets, cheap corporate 
bond financing practically disappeared due to lower credit ratings of the insur-
ers that guaranteed returns to investors (Stiff, 2008).  The availability of 
cheaper bond financing is not likely return until recovery of the capital markets 
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so, until then, bank finance remains virtually the only alternative.  As banks 
became much more risk averse in their lending, it became much more difficult 
and more expensive to secure finance and this affected the number of  
planned projects reaching financial close of contracts.  Thus, during 2008 only 
34 projects’ financing agreements were finalised, about half of the annual rate 
for the previous years (Timmins, 2009a).   
HSBC, a commercial bank heavily engaged in lending to PFIs before the 
credit crunch began restricting its lending for PFIs to short-term funding and 
now only lends to clients it knows and trusts them to repay those loans. RBS 
and HBOS, two other commercial banks, had also both been large PFI lenders 
prior to the credit crunch but RBS (now 70% state-owned) subsequently 
scaled down its involvement and the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB further 
reduced its willingness to lend to PFIs. 
In addition to the drastic reduction of funding available from the banks, 
large-scale projects have experienced even more severe problems because 
banks’ appetite for buying syndicated debt, which is a part of the total PFI 
debt, has been substantially reduced.  This in turn increased the overall financ-
ing costs (O’Connor, 2008). 
Since the beginning of 2009 some of the banks have been returning to 
the market but the availability of finance has been severely restricted by higher 
margins being required and much tougher lending conditions.  The financial 
arrangements now tend to involve multiple investors, instead of only one or 
two banks and the duration of contracts has typically been reduced from 25-30 
to 7-10 years.  Moreover, banks are generally unwilling to finance more than 
£30 to £50 million on a single transaction and so are looking for other partici-
pants to provide the rest of the capital requirement (Timmins, 2009a).  This 
means that the process of arranging PFI finance has become slower and more 
uncertain.  Additionally, banks require credit risk to be passed to service pro-
viders and where possible, they have been looking for government guarantees 
in case of financial difficulties. 
Additional challenges are expected with the introduction of new account-
ing standards.  Since April 2009, due to the adoption of the International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the UK government, the accounting treat-
ment of PFI projects changed and the majority of PFI projects now have to be 
entered on public sector balance sheets.  Having previously been “off balance 
sheet”, there has been speculation that this new accounting rule will remove 
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the accounting and perhaps political driver for this procurement route at central 
and local government level. 

4. Impact on Public Services in the UK 

Local governments are responsible for providing most public services in 
the UK and they were already having to deal with demographic changes, age-
ing population, centrally-required efficiency savings and other financial cuts 
prior to the credit crunch (Anon, 2008a). Reflecting the public finance costs of 
dealing with the credit crunch (see above), the UK government announced 
further funding cuts in its April 2009 Budget.  Municipalities’ revenues have 
also been adversely affected by the reduced demand for some chargeable 
services, by falling asset sales and by diminishing receipts from developers 
caused by the slump in the housing market.   
Furthermore, more than a hundred UK local authorities may lose the £840 
million they deposited in the collapsed Icelandic banking system because of 
the lack of UK government protection (Anon, 2008b).  The loss of these deposits 
could potentially affect the financial stability of these councils and their provi-
sion of services. 
The financial difficulties faced by local and central government have direct 
implications for the provision of future roads, recycling plants, schools and 
hospitals which, in some cases, have effectively ground to a halt due to the 
failure of banks to invest in PFIs.  A report by the NAO revealed that the Build-
ing Schools for the Future (BFS) programme, a version of PFI in England and 
Wales, was two years behind schedule and £10 billion over budget (McAlpine, 
2009).  The program effectively stalled, only two projects being signed during 
the previous six months (Hayman, 2009).   
Other sectors have also been affected.  The National Health Service (NHS) 
hospital rebuilding program depended entirely on PFI and there was no “plan 
B” for meeting the financial requirement (Curtis, 2009).  In 2008, twelve major 
PFI hospital projects were abandoned due to lack of finance.  In March 2008, it 
was announced that the plans for financing a PFI hospital for Maidstone and 
Tunbridge NHS Trust in Kent through corporate bonds issue had to be aban-
doned and the client had to revert to more expensive bank finance (O’Connor, 
2008).  Similarly, the largest PFI (£1 billion) intended to provide the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) with a fleet of refuelling tankers faced similar problems and its 
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financial structure has been under consideration.  Doubts have been expressed 
about the upgrade of the M25 motorway around London and of modernisation 
of the Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly London Underground lines (Leftly, 
2009). 
By contrast, recent reports in the media indicate that a version of PFI used 
by the Department of Health in England and Wales known as Express Lift has 
proved to be better suited to the current financial environment (Timmins, 
2009b).  These are typically smaller projects, in the range of £3 to £7 million, 
which means that the arrangement of the capital requirement is not as prob-
lematic as for large-scale PFIs.  The Express Lift model involves a joint venture 
between the primary care trusts (and sometimes local authorities) which own 
40 per cent of the equity stake, and the private companies for the purpose of 
financing, building and running GP (i.e. family doctor) surgeries and other 
health facilities over 20 years.  Under Express Lift there is a framework con-
tract with seven selected private sector consortiums which have quasi-
monopoly power over the entire market.  NHS primary care trusts are no 
longer required to prepare and conduct a full EU-wide tendering process as 
they can choose any one from these seven consortia.  This means a consider-
able speeding up of the procurement and negotiation time scale from a typical 
two years to several months, reducing the excessive PFI bidding costs. 
In Scotland, public service provision has been affected by the tough UK-
wide economic conditions and eight Scottish local authorities may lose the £45 
million deposited in Icelandic banks (Fegan, 2008; Gunn, 2008). Additionally, 
Scottish local authorities are particularly badly affected by the Scottish gov-
ernment abandoning the use of PFIs for new projects in 2007.   
The Scottish government introduced what was intended to be a different 
form of Public Private Partnership vehicle called the Scottish Futures Trust 
(SFT) as an alternative to PFI.  However, the SFT has so far failed to commis-
sion new infrastructure projects, leading to protracted delays in the delivery of 
new public services and to heavy criticism that it is not a workable alternative 
to PFIs (Scottish, 2009).   
The apparent failure of the SFT has caused further uncertainty in the build-
ing industry and the housing market which have been virtually at a standstill for 
the last two years.   The lack of infrastructure projects exacerbated the losses 
of many private sector companies.  There have been calls from various political 
parties and from the industry for the Scottish government to abandon the SFT 
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and to revert back to the PFI which, despite its problems, has a proven delivery 
track record (Gunn, 2008; Glackin, 2009).   
Compounding this widespread criticism, financial industry representatives 
have also expressed their lack of confidence in the SFT model.  In the absence 
of projects being put out to tender by the SFT, experienced PFI teams at 
banks, construction and consultancy companies are being dismantled or 
moved to other parts of the country, leading to loss of expertise.  Not surpris-
ingly, the Scottish government has been accused of “tunnel vision” (Glackin, 
2009).   
Another consequence of the Scottish government’s abandonment of PFIs 
is that Scotland fails to benefit from the UK Treasury’s additional financial sup-
port for provision of public sector infrastructure. This support was introduced in 
March 2009 and applies only to PFI schemes. 
5. UK Government Support for PFI Projects 

As explained above, the PFI program in all service sectors has been af-
fected by the funding crisis as capital markets collapsed and banks refused to 
lend at reasonable rates. In January 2009, it became clear that the government 
would underwrite some larger scale PFI transactions. In order to assure inves-
tors that taxpayers will shoulder some of the costs, the UK government was 
already underwriting some shorter-term and lower-scale transactions.   
Determined to pursue the PFI option, in March 2009 the UK government 
announced taxpayers’ money would be used to rescue PFI projects in the form 
of bridging loans of between £1 billion and £2 billion in 2009-10 (Hayman, 
2009; Hencke, 2009, Milmo et al. 2009). It wants private finance to continue to 
play an important role in public service provision, particularly in the light of the 
announced “cash freeze” in public sector capital expenditure from 2011.  This 
is the case even though the IFRS requires PFIs now to be on the public sector 
balance sheet. 
The UK government’s Infrastructure Finance Unit (dubbed “the Treasury 
bank” now lends directly to PFI projects and also indirectly to them via gov-
ernment-owned banks. Although initially restricting its support to bridging 
loans, the Treasury bank can also provide the full amount of senior debt re-
quired by a PFI project. It is also considering other ways of helping finance 
stalled PFI projects by, for example, underwriting bank debt and providing eq-
uity bridging loans.  
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This finance for stalled PFIs is part of broader measures aiming to stimu-
late the economy and create jobs during the recession.  Public sector bodies 
have to apply to the UK Treasury through their government departments for 
financial support.  Loans must be repaid when future lending conditions 
improve and the projects are refinanced.  The Treasury can also re-sell the 
loans when the market recovers.   
According to the UK Treasury, 110 major PFI infrastructure projects worth 
an estimated £13 billion then in the pipeline would be saved from collapse by 
this support.  While the Treasury is willing to provide co-funding, it will provide 
the full financial requirement for some projects if necessary.  Priority is given 
to waste recycling schemes with a view of helping UK avoid the heavy EU 
fines it will incur if it misses the mandatory targets to half landfill use by 2013 
(Hencke, 2009).  The money also provides financial help for ten PFI hospital 
projects delayed due to lack of finance. 
This support has been met with political opposition because, as noted 
above, PFI schemes are now reflected in government accounts.  The govern-
ment has been criticized for removing the private element from PFI.  According 
to the Treasury spokesman of the Conservative party Phillip Hammond “if you 
take the private finance out of PFI, you haven’t got much left…and if you trans-
fer the financial risk back to the public sector, then that has to be reflected in 
the structure of the contract” (Timmins, 2009a, p. 11). 
Similar criticisms have also been made by the general secretary of the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC). He noted that such an arrangement will allow 
the privatisation of the profits and the nationalisation of the losses (Leftly, 
2009).  The paradox is that many PFIs are financed by HBOS and RBS.  Thus, 
the government is subsidising the contracts in order to guarantee returns to 
the banks rescued with tax payers’ money.  Future generations are likely to 
face repayment of huge national debt and cuts in public spending while, at the 
same time, having to continue payments to the banks that have been bailed 
out.   
The counter-argument is that even if the bulk of the capital requirement 
comes from the Treasury, private sector companies are still required to provide 
equity capital which takes most of the risk.  As a financier, the government has 
to conduct rigorous risk assessment, due diligence and impose the financial 
discipline that is normally introduced by the banks.  There is also a possibility 
for a conflict of interests when the UK central government acts as both a 
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funder and a purchaser, even if the purchasing is conducted through local 
government or NHS trusts. 

6. Future Prospects for the PFI Model in the UK 

In March 2009 it was announced that the UK Treasury will undertake a 
six-month review of PFI which will assess the future of the scheme.  While the 
outcome of the review is uncertain, the expectation is that it is likely to pro-
pose some alterations and readjustments in line with changed market condi-
tions (Leftly, 2009). 
The future expansion of public services appears very heavily constrained 
by the UK government’s April 2009 Budget’s medium-term plans of only 0.7 
per cent annual growth of public expenditure and by increasingly substantial 
repayments of long-term debt. This will encourage the search for innovative 
approaches which build on the advantages of PFI. It has been argued that 
the PFI process has contributed to public sector learning and that, if possi-
ble, government policy should ensure the continuation of the benefits 
brought by it (PwC, 2008).  According to PwC, the key beneficial outcomes 
of PFI include: 
 Focus on outputs/outcomes rather than inputs; 
 More rigorous risk/cost analysis; 
 Optimal allocation of risk; 
 Synergies and integration of design/construction/ opera-
tion/maintenance; 
 Whole-life costing; 
 Comprehensive competition across all elements of the project; 
 Long-term performance management; 
 Whole-contract management and hand-back of the asset in  
contractually agreed condition. 

A return to traditional procurement and financing practices could lead to a 
relaxation of these PFI disciplines. There is clearly a need to retain those disci-
plines by utilising techniques such as comprehensive risk assessment and by 
paying attention to, and providing incentives for, reduction of life-cycle costs.   
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The public sector should also consider carefully the evaluation of the new 
PFI models (such as the BSF and Lift models noted above and which involve pub-
lic sector equity) against the new risks associated with them. Particular attention 
should be given to maintaining the focus on risk analysis and allocation, as well as 
the due diligence disciplines which, in a typical PFI, are introduced by lenders, 
monocline insurers and ratings agencies. 
Prior to adoption of the new IFRS and the changes to the accounting 
treatment of PFIs, their off-balance-sheet treatment had been a pre-requisite 
for the award of PFI credit and was used as a proxy indicating sufficient trans-
fer of risk to the private sector.  However, other criteria can be used to ensure 
sufficient risk transfer and the impact of bringing PFI liabilities on-balance-
sheet depends on the model adopted for the distribution of PFI credits.   
Changes to the accounting treatment of PFIs should have little or no im-
pact for central government projects, the majority of which have been classi-
fied as on-balance-sheet. However, off-balance-sheet borrowing by the UK 
government stood at almost £20 billion by early 2009. This had been facilitated 
by turning public sector organisations into not-for-profit companies inde-
pendent of central government. Examples are Network Rail (the company 
owning the UK’s railway lines and signalling systems), the BBC Trust and 
Welsh Water (which provides water and sewerage services in Wales). Their 
borrowing does not affect governmental borrowing limits because, technically, 
they are deemed by the UK’s Office of National Statistics not to be in the pub-
lic sector. Together with the off-balance-sheet treatment of PFI liabilities, this 
effectively under-reports public sector debt in the UK and so qualifies compari-
son of its past debt-to-GDP ratios with other countries (see above). 
The not-for-profit format has also been proposed for the state-owned Post 
Office and Royal Mail in order to raise private finance from capital markets to 
pay for investment in new technology without affecting governmental borrow-
ing limits or requiring full privatisation or use of PFIs. Given that PFIs are now 
on the public sector balance sheet, it could be expected that the not-for-profit 
ownership structure will be more widely adopted.   
 
7. Conclusions 

Even before the credit crunch PFIs were criticised for being more expen-
sive than direct government borrowing for financing provision of public service 
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infrastructure. The UK government’s response to the credit crunch has now 
reversed the very risk transfer that was supposed to more than compensate 
for those higher interest rate costs. This reversal is the result of the govern-
ment now financing banks so they can on-lend to PFIs at higher interest rate 
mark-ups and the debt relating to that on-lending is effectively guaranteed by 
the government. 
Despite these and other criticisms, the PFI can be expected to survive in 
the long term. First, a huge financial services industry has been created round 
it in the City of London. Second, the Labour Government is providing short-
term support and is willing to consider longer-term measures until bank credit 
becomes much more easily available. Third, the Conservative Party will almost 
certainly maintain that support if it wins power at the next general election. 
Fourth, capital markets can reasonably be expected to recover, the only real 
doubt being precisely when. Fifth, as noted above, the standard PFI model can 
be and is being restructured so as to strengthen the advantages and minimise 
the disadvantages. Certainly, other forms of Public-Private Partnerships are 
already in use in the UK and other countries. 
Together with use of conventional procurement, increased adoption of the 
not-for-profit format, direct borrowing by local governments issuing their own 
bonds, and other means, it could be expected that an increasingly diverse mix-
ture of various procurement methods will be identified across the different 
parts of the UK public sector, adapted to the mixed, pluralistic requirements of 
the various service programmes seeking capital procurement.  

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POVZETEK 
VPLIV POSOJILNEGA KR^A NA FINANCIRANJE  
INFRASTRUKTURE JAVNEGA SEKTORJA V      
ZDRUŽENEM KRALJESTVU VELIKE BRITANIJE IN  
SEVERNE IRSKE (VB) V LETIH 2007-2009 
 
»Posojilni kr~« je nastal v letih 2007 do 2009 kot zastoj ban~nih posojil, 
ker so se stro{ki posojil prebivalstvu in stro{ki medban~nih posojil preti-
rano povi{ali ali pa posojila preprosto niso bila dostopna. Njegov izvor je 
bil v ohlapnem pravnem redu za banke in v neustreznem varnostnem sis-
temu centralne banke za odkrivanje bank z likvidnostnimi problemi; veliko 
manj strogo regulirani ban~ni sistem v senci se je hitro razvijal, kot posle-
dica agresivne ban~ne konkurence so se banke zatekale k novim 
finan~nim storitvam, ob tem pa se je vedno bolj obsežno prelival medna-
rodni tok kapitala. Preprosto povedano, posojilni kr~ je bil rezultat vladnih 
deregulacij kreditiranja brez uvedbe dovolj stroge samoregulacije, brez 
ustreznih postopkov upravljanja in brez zadostnega nadzora uporabljenih 
modelov tveganja. 
Med letoma 2007 in 2009 so državne prora~une VB potrjevali po tedaj 
splo{no poveli~evanem na~elu »previdnost z namenom«. Zdaj pa se zdi, 
da je bil odziv na posojilni kr~ »neprevidnost z namenom«. Ko je vlada 
nakupila velik delež delnic v raznih bankah VB in uvedla posebne likvidno-
stne sheme, je dejansko dovolila bankam, da so podržavile svoje hitro 
rasto~e izgube in hkrati privatizirale svoje dobi~ke. 
Pretežno neocenljiva finan~na tveganja so se tako prenesla iz zaseb-
nega v javni sektor, podobno kot se je to zgodilo v drugih državah. Tako 
ravnanje državnih vlad  bi  težko ozna~ili kot previdno, saj povzro~a  
moralni hazard in ustvarja presedan za prihodnje finan~ne injekcije dav-
kopla~evalcev za zelo neodgovorno izvajanje ban~nih posojilnih poslov. 
Opravi~evanje sedanje izredno tvegane javnofinan~ne radodarnosti z 
argumenti, da bi bilo za zdravje gospodarstva v prihodnosti dražje, ~e ne 
bi storili ni~, pomeni zaupanje v uspeh vedno ve~jih ban~nih finan~nih 
injekcij in zanemarja vpra{anje, kako bodo popla~ani velikanski porasti 
državnega dolga.  
Vlada VB je opustila svoja lastna javnofinan~na pravila, namre~ »zlato 
pravilo« (posojaj samo za kapitalske, ne teko~e izdatke) in »vzdržno inves-
ticijsko pravilo« (neto javni dolg naj ne bo ve~ji kot 40% BDP). [tevilke, ki 
jih je sama objavila, kažejo, da je v januarju 2009 neto javni dolg presegel 
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50% BDP in napovedujejo, da se bo povzpel do skoraj 60% BDP v letih 
2012/13. 
Posojilni kr~ v letih 2007-09 je ne samo ustvaril probleme v javnih 
financah za pokrivanje stro{kov finan~nih injekcij poslovnim bankam in pri 
poslovanju v recesiji, ampak je tudi zavrl  zagotavljanje bolj{ih javnih sto-
ritev. Zlasti je bilo oskrbovanje nove infrastrukture javnega sektorja in 
povezanih storitev okrnjeno z u~inki posojilnega kr~a na pobude za zaseb-
no financiranje (PFI). Kapitalski trgi so postali veliko manj naklonjeni pre-
vzemanju finan~nih tveganj, povezanih s shemami PFI, vedno manj{e je 
tudi povpra{evanje po podjetni{kih obveznicah, ki se obi~ajno  uporablja-
jo za njihovo financiranje. Poslovne banke so pri odobravanju posojil prip-
ravljene  upo{tevati financiranje z obveznicami le, ~e se o pogodbah PFI 
ponovno pogajajo in tako zmanj{ajo finan~na tveganja. 
Po zlomu kapitalskih trgov v letu 2008 je prakti~no izginilo poceni 
financiranje projektov PFI s podjetni{kimi obveznicami zaradi slab{ih 
ratingov zavarovateljev, ki so jam~ili donose investitorjem. Financiranje s 
cenej{imi obveznicami verjetno ne bo ve~ dostopno do ponovne vzposta-
vitve kapitalskega trga, zato je ostalo ban~no financiranje kot edina mož-
nost. Ker so banke postajale vedno bolj previdne pri prevzemanju posojil-
nih tveganj, je zagotavljanje finan~nih sredstev postajalo veliko težje in 
dražje, kar je prizadelo {tevilne na~rtovane projekte, ki so bili v fazi 
finan~ne konstrukcije. 
V za~etku leta 2009 so se nekatere banke vrnile na trg, toda dostop-
nost finan~nih sredstev je bila zelo omejena zaradi zahtevanih vi{jih 
ban~nih marž in  zaradi veliko strožjih posojilnih pogojev. Namesto ene ali 
dveh bank finan~ni posli zdaj obi~ajno zajemajo ve~ investitorjev, trajanje 
kreditiranja se je skraj{alo od 25 do 30 let na 7 do 10 let. Na splo{no banke 
niso pripravljene financirati ve~ kot 30 do 50 milijonov funtov pri eni tran-
sakciji in zato i{~ejo druge udeležence, ki bi zagotovili preostanek potreb-
nega kapitala. To pomeni, da je proces dogovarjanja financiranja investicij 
PFI postal bolj po~asen in bolj negotov. Banke poleg tega zahtevajo, da se 
posojilno tveganje prenese na ponudnike storitev in i{~ejo državne garan-
cije za primer finan~nih težav. 
V januarju 2009 se je razvedelo, da bo vlada VB prevzela nekaj obsež-
nej{ih transakcij PFI. Državni oddelek za financiranje infrastrukture (z dru-
gim imenom »Banka zakladnica«) zdaj posoja sredstva projektom PFI 
neposredno in tudi posredno prek bank v državni lasti. ^eprav je Banka 
zakladnica v za~etku omejevala podporo premostitvenim posojilom, lahko 
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zdaj zagotovi tudi polni znesek prednostnih dolgov, ki je potreben za pro-
jekt PFI. Preverja tudi druge na~ine pomo~i zastalim projektom PFI, tako 
da bi na primer prevzela ban~ni dolg in zagotovila premostitvena posojila 
za lastni{ki kapital. 
Kot poro~a Zakladnica VB, se bo s to pomo~jo pred propadom re{ilo 
110 ve~jih PFI infrastrukturnih projektov, vrednih 13 milijard funtov. Med-
tem ko je Zakladnica pripravljena zagotoviti sofinanciranje, bo za nekatere 
projekte po potrebi zagotovila tudi vsa finan~na sredstva. Prednost bodo 
imeli na~rti recikliranja odpadkov, zato da bi pomagali VB, da se izogne 
kaznim EU, ~e ne bodo doseženi obvezni cilji razpolovitve odlagali{~ 
odpadkov v zemljo do leta 2013. Finan~na pomo~ naj bi se uporabila tudi 
za deset projektov PFI za izgradnjo bolni{nic, ki so zastali zaradi pomanj-
kanja finan~nih sredstev. 
Državna podpora je bila deležna politi~nega nasprotovanja, ker se 
sheme PFI zdaj odražajo v državnem prora~unu. Zlasti so kritizirali vlado, 
ker je iz PFI odstranila zasebni delež. Taka ureditev omogo~a privatizacijo 
dobi~kov in nacionalizacijo izgub. Paradoks je v tem, da {tevilne projekte 
PFI financirata HBIOS in RBS, poslovni banki, ki ju je re{ila vlada VB. Tako 
vlada subvencionira pogodbe PFI, zato da zagotovi donose bankam, ki jih 
je re{ila z denarjem davkopla~evalcev. Prihodnje generacije se bodo verjetno 
soo~ale s popla~ilom velikanskega državnega dolga in z rezanjem javnih 
izdatkov, hkrati pa bodo morale {e vedno pla~evati bankam, ki so prejele 
finan~ne injekcije. Že pred posojilnim kr~em so kritizirali projekte PFI, da 
so dražji kot neposredno posojanje vlade za financiranje izgradnje javne 
infrastrukture. Odziv vlade VB na posojilni kr~ je zdaj spremenil tveganje, 
ki naj bi povzro~ilo vi{je stro{ke obresti. Ta preobrat je rezultat sedanjega 
državnega financiranja bank, tako da lahko naprej kreditirajo PFI po vi{jih 
obrestni meri, za dolg, ki nastaja ob tem kreditiranju, pa dejansko jam~i 
vlada. 
Kljub tem in drugim kritikam lahko pri~akujemo, da bo PFI na dolgi rok 
preživelo. Prvi~ se je v Londonu ustvarila velika ponudba finan~nih stori-
tev. Drugi~, laburisti~na vlada VB zagotavlja podporo v kratkem roku in je 
pripravljena razmisliti o dolgoro~nih ukrepih, dokler ban~na posojila ne 
postanejo veliko bolj dostopna. Tretji~, konzervativna stranka bo skoraj 
zagotovo nadaljevala to podporo, ~e pride na oblast pri naslednjih 
splo{nih volitvah. ^etrti~, kapitalski trgi si bodo po vsej verjetnosti opo-
mogli, ostane samo vpra{anje, kdaj se bo to zgodilo. Peti~: standardni 
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model PFI je mogo~e preoblikovati in to se že dogaja, tako da se krepijo 
njegove prednosti in zmanj{ajo slabosti. 
Medtem pa finan~ne težave, s katerimi se soo~ajo na~rti PFI lokalnih 
vlad in centralne vlade, neposredno vplivajo na izgradnje cest, naprav za 
recikliranje, {ol in bolni{nic, ki so se v nekaterih primerih ustavile zaradi 
nesposobnosti bank, da bi investirale v PFI. 
Alternativna možnost ~akanju na oživitev kapitalskih trgov in projektov 
PFI je morda preoblikovanje organizacij javnega sektorja v VB v neprofitne 
združbe, neodvisne od države. Primeri so Network Rail (združba, ki je last-
nica železnic in signalizacijskih sistemov v VB), BBC Trust an Welsh Water 
(ki zagotavlja vodo in lo~evanje odpadkov v Walesu). Posojila teh združb 
ne zadevajo vladne omejitve kreditiranja, zato ker ju državni statisti~ni 
urad tehni~no ne obravnava kot del javnega sektorja. 
Tako obliko je predlagala državna po{ta, Post Office and Royal Mail, 
zato da bi pridobila zasebna finan~na sredstva iz kapitalskih trgov za 
popla~ilo investicij v nove tehnologije, ne da bi zadela ob vladne omejitve 
kreditiranja ali da bi morala izvesti polno privatizacijo ali uporabo PFI. 
Glede na to, da so PFI del  bilance javnega sektorja, bi lahko pri~akovali, 
da se bo pogosteje privzemala struktura neprofitnega lastni{tva. 
Zato lahko pri~akujemo, da se bodo ob konvencionalnih oblikah oskr-
be s kapitalom vedno bolj uveljavljale najrazli~nej{e, nove metode oskrbe, 
kot so prevzemanje neprofitnega statusa organizacije, neposredno krediti-
ranje lokalnih skupnosti z izdajanjem obveznic in drugi na~ini, v odgovor 
na raznovrstne, množi~ne potrebe javnega sektorja po svežem kapitalu.
